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COVID19 and the Struggle to Re-Order Relations in the Persian Gulf  
 
 
On the 24th March 2020, an emergency summit comprised of Finance Ministers from the 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) took place. The summit was extra-ordinary: In addition to 
being the first meeting with Qatari participation since the blockade of 2017, it took place 
online amidst the growing coronavirus pandemic. In a moment of optimism, it appeared 
that the 6 member states of the GCC could begin to find points of commonality beyond the 
blockade, moving on from a bitter dispute that had proved incredibly disruptive to all 
involved (Ulrichsen, 2020). Yet in spite of this optimism, the complexities of regional politics 
within the covid19 pandemic made serious rapprochement unattainable at this point in 
time.  
 
One of the main charges levied at Qatar was engagement with Iran, a long-standing rival of 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, other Arab Gulf states, Israel and the USA. It was somewhat 
surprising then that following the onset of the covid19 pandemic, the Islamic Republic 
declared that a process of coordination had taken place with the UAE, in direct contrast with 
a previous manifestation of regional order which sought to marginalize Iran and reduce its 
influence across the Gulf and wider Middle East. This process, coming during the early 
months of the pandemic – although later eroded – posed questions about the extent to 
which the coronavirus crisis was the conduit for re-ordering regional politics, or whether this 
move was more opportunistic. 
 
In times of crisis it is often said that everything has changed or, conversely, that nothing has 
changed. The reality, of course, typically lies somewhere in between, reflecting the 
subtleties and nuances of context specific contingencies. Regional politics across the Persian 
Gulf and broader Middle East is no different. In the coming months, GCC member states 
began to forge their own paths in regional affairs, aided and constrained by the context of 
the pandemic. In what follows I offer a brief set of reflections about the impact of the 
covid19 pandemic on the Persian Gulf, with a particular focus on regional politics. 
 
Over the past decade, regional politics across the Persian Gulf - and within the GCC in 
particular - has increasingly been characterised by suspicion and mutual distrust. 
Predominantly appearing in the guise of tensions between the Arab side of the Gulf on the 
west and the Iranian side on the east - divisions which are exacerbated by ethnicity, religion, 
economics, geopolitics, demographics, and geography - are coupled with intra-Arab and 
intra-GCC tensions about the nature of regional order.  
 
Yet at times of crisis, as Michael Barnett (1998) astutely observed, opportunities emerge to 
reshape the nature of relations. In what follows I reflect on Barnett’s Constructivist take to 
explore the nature of Persian Gulf politics at a regional level. Other contributors to this 
special issue take a deeper dive into the intricacies of political, social, economic, governance 
and human rights concerns and, as such, I will largely steer clear of such observations. 
Instead, I will engage in a broader set of reflections about the nature of regional order and 
the impact of ‘black swan’ events on changing order.  
From Dialogues in Arab Politics to Dialogues in Pandemic Politics 
 
For Michael Barnett, writing in Dialogues in Arab Politics (1998) moments of crisis provide 
opportunities to renegotiate regional order by re-imagining the norms that shape this order. 
Central to this approach is a focus on the interaction of norms and identities in contrast to 
the more materially driven approach of Realists. Indeed, for Barnett, a struggle over the 
nature of ideational factors and the ways in which leaders derive legitimacy from identity 
and ideology offers a more convincing explanation of the ordering of regional politics. 
 
Although predominantly concerned with a struggle over – and to define – Arabism, Barnett 
offers a constructivist account concerned both with the importance of identity and the 
construction of order through interactions at times of crisis. While there is not scope to go 
into the nature of crisis, the covid19 pandemic appears to meet many of the criteria for 
what many may conceive of as a crisis. Following Barnett’s argument, times of regional 
uncertainty and crisis such as the coronavirus allow for a renegotiating of visions of regional 
order, bringing together key actors to engage in a process of dialogue over the nature of 
norms and identities, for both domestic and regional audiences, albeit with repercussions 
for regional order (1998). 
 
While Middle Eastern politics was previously characterised by a struggle over Arabism, in 
recent years, order across the Gulf and wider Middle East has been underpinned by an overt 
anti-Iranianism which has often been fused with the Shi’a sect of Islam meaning that this 
regional ordering has domestic repercussions (Mabon, 2020a, 2013). The emergence of 
conflicts in Syria and Yemen post 2011, coupled with precarious political contexts in Bahrain, 
Iraq and Lebanon, has created conditions that facilitate and exacerbate this anti-Iranian 
sentiment, often pitting Gulf Arab states – led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE – against Iran. 
Yet the early months of the pandemic hinted at a reimagining of regional order, particularly 
driven by the actions of the UAE, dissenting from the ‘old order’ and bringing out into the 
open an apparent thaw in relations with Iran. While ultimately short lived due to the 
normalisation of relations between the UAE and Israel – once again bringing out into the 
open an existing set of discussions – the humanitarian cost of the covid19 pandemic 
presented the UAE with an opportunity to exert influence through the provision of aid, 
increasing its standing in the process.  
 
Iran and the Gulf States 
 
Since revolutionary fervour toppled the Shah of Iran and ultimately led to the establishment 
of an Islamic Republic in 1979, relations between Iran and the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf – predominantly led by Saudi Arabia - have been fraught (Mabon, 2013). Oscillating 
between periods of overt hostility and burgeoning rapprochement, the Islamic Republic has 
been viewed with a great deal of trepidation by many in the Gulf due to competing visions 
of regional order. Competing claims to religious legitimacy supplement long-standing 
geopolitical visions about order and security in the Gulf, are exacerbated by contradictory 
views over the role of the United States in ensuring regional security.  
 
Providing a complete history of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is beyond the scope 
of this paper but in the years after the revolution, a number of events that puncture this 
history are worth noting (Mabon, 2020b). First, the revolution fused religion and politics and 
set the tone for the decades that followed. Second, after the catastrophic repercussions of 
the war with Iraq, Iran experienced a devastating earthquake which resulted in a 
catastrophic loss of life. Following the provision of humanitarian aid - and shuttle diplomacy 
between the two states, relations began to thaw, leading to a period of quasi 
rapprochement (Wastnidge, 2016). Third, with the declaration of the US’ War on Terror and 
‘Axis of Evil’ rhetoric, the apparent rapprochement between the two states ended, 
exacerbated by the Arab Uprisings and the sectarianization of regional politics that followed 
(Hashemi and Postel, 2017; Mabon, 2020a).  
 
Central to the evolution of these relations are particular events that bring about a 
renegotiation of regional order. Indeed, following Barnett’s argument, it is easy to see how 
relations have been re-worked at times of crisis, with the earthquake providing perhaps the 
best example of a crisis providing the capacity to move towards improving 
relations. Similarly, following the onset of the war on terror, relations were reset. In the 
years that followed, relations between Riyadh and Tehran deteriorated, exacerbated by the 
fragmentation of political projects and rising sectarian tensions, the two began to engage in 





In line with Barnett’s claim about the opportunities presented by the onset of crises, the 
emergence of the pandemic provided an opportunity to reset order in the Gulf. When 
covid19 hit Iran in the early months of 2020, the humanitarian crisis that followed was 
devastating. Close to 4000 were killed by the end of the first week of April, while an 
estimated 42,000 are shown to have died in government records, albeit almost triple what 
the government had publicly declared (BBC). Video footage coming out of a state already 
creaking under the strain of an international sanctions regime. 
 
Efforts to trace the epicentre of regional cases quickly focussed on Iran and religious 
pilgrimages to the Islamic Republic. Although illegal to travel to Iran from the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia - and a source of concern in others - many routinely make the trip, often via 
intermediaries. The flow of people to - and from - Qom was heralded as the source of rise, 
leading to increasingly vitriolic sectarian rhetoric from some and the continued 
sectarianization of Shi’a groups. Yet closer exploration suggested that travel from Wuhan, 
the source of the virus, was responsible for infection rates in the Gulf. In spite of this, the 
pandemic highlighted political and social schisms within and across Gulf states, notably 
along sectarian lines (Matthiesen, 2020).  
 
In response to the crisis, a number of states began to send aid to the Islamic Republic, 
including from long-time rivals. Perhaps the most surprising of these states to provide aid 
was the United Arab Emirates (Galeeva, 2020) which had long been opposed to the Islamic 
Republic, engaging in military action in Yemen in an effort to counter Iranian gains (Juneau, 
2020). The UAE’s actions in providing were well received by Iranians, with Seyyed Abbas 
Mousavi declaring sincere thanks “for these humanitarian efforts” proclaiming that the 
Islamic Republic would “never forget the way they stood with Iran in hard times” (Mehr 
News, 17.03.20). The actions demonstrate the capacity to override what previously 
appeared to be intractable differences and re-negotiating regional order in the process. 
 
Yet across 2019 and into 2020, the UAE had sought to assert itself as a regional power 
across the Middle East, exerting influence in a range of different arenas. Central to this, 
however, was a move away from Saudi Arabia’s vision for regional order, particularly with 
regard to Iran, but also over Yemen and Israel. The decision to engage with Iran was not 
purely a response to the pandemic. Indeed, underpinning this were a series of track II 
dialogues between the Emirates and Iran which had been taking place across 2018.  
In October 2019, the UAE released $700 million of frozen funds to Iran as part of a 
burgeoning thaw in relations (Fenton-Harvey, 2020). The UAE also began a new form of soft 
power posturing, positioning itself as the world’s largest aid donor during the pandemic, 
reflecting both national ambition and a new form of humanitarian diplomacy (Datta-Ray, 
2020). While the decision to withdraw from Yemen suggested an emerging divergence away 
from Saudi Arabia, it was the move towards Iran that hinted at something more serious.  
 
The Emirati approach highlighted the capacity to use the crisis as a means of re-imagining 
regional relations, moving beyond previous ways of ordering Gulf – and wider Middle 
Eastern – politics. The Emirati approach  prompted calls for similar approaches from the 
United States towards Iran, notably the easing of the “maximum pressure” policy deployed 
by the Trump regime. In contrast, the Trump administration appeared unwilling to shift its 
stance. 
 
Of course there are pragmatic reasons for such gestures and diplomatic overtures. The UAE 
was hit financially after sanctions were imposed Iran given the complexity of economic 
relations with the two states, with the UAE one of Iran’s largest trading partners. Moreover, 
a number of Emirati companies were blacklisted by the US for failing to comply with 
sanctions (Reuters, 19.03.20). 
 
In spite of this goodwill, tensions remained high, stemming from the  
normalisation of relations between the UAE and Israel, announced on the 13th August, 
which appears to have brought an end to any burgeoning rapprochement with Iran. Indeed, 
tensions manifested in the seizure of an Emirati vessel and the detention of its crew after 
Iranian fishermen were killed (Reuters, 20.08.20). Additionally, while aid was provided to 
Iran, the UAE appeared to support the continuation of US sanctions on Iran (Cole, 2020) 
 
In contrast to the Emirati response, Saudi Arabia cordoned off the Eastern Province of the 
Kingdom, home to a large percentage of the Kingdom’s Shi’a population after a number of 
citizens returned from Iran with the virus (The Guardian, 09.03.20). Supporting the Saudi 
position, Bahrain accused Iran of “biological aggression” covering up spread of virus and 
failing to stamp passports of Bahraini travellers visiting the country (Eltahir and Barrington, 
11.03.20). 
 
Although travelling to Iran is illegal, an amnesty was given to anyone who came forward to 
facilitate track and trace processes. Additionally, Riyadh also accused Iran of engaging in 
“irresponsible actions” in spreading the virus (Arab News, 2020). The Saudi response also 
included efforts to block diplomatic measures designed to condemn US sanctions on Iran, 
deemed a “great pity” by Mousavi (Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  
 
 
Rejecting the Dialogue 
 
With the UAE appearing to open up to dialogue with Iran and the reimagining of regional 
order, questions quickly emerged as to why Saudi Arabia appeared reluctant to embark on a 
similar path. Although the Kingdom had chosen not to respond with force to the Abqaiq 
attacks, despite appearing to have been given a green light to do so - instead choosing to 
call for restraint, much like after the killing of Qassim Soleimani (Mabon, 2020b) - the onset 
of the pandemic was met with stony silence. Unlike the events of 30 years earlier, Saudi 
Arabia did not engage in a reimagining of regional order. 
A range of factors feed into this decision, demonstrating the myriad competing forces 
shaping domestic and regional politics. Thus, while Barnett argues that crises provide 
opportunities for reimagining regional relations, crises alone are not sufficient. 
 
Unlike the 1990s, domestic developments were not conducive towards a burgeoning 
rapprochement. By the end of the 1980s developments in Iran - notably after the death of 
Ruhollah Khomeini - allowed space for more reform minded individuals to facilitate a thaw 
in relations. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia the actions of Crown Prince Abdullah were in concert 
with Iranian elites. In contrast, domestic politics in both states appeared to prohibit any 
form of dialogue with each other. 
 
By the time of the Covid pandemic, Iran had been largely marginalised from the 
international community as a consequence of biting US sanctions, leading to a dramatic fall 
in economic growth from 13% in 2016 to minus 7.6% in 2019 (Salelhi-Isfahani, 2020). In such 
a context, Iranian officials led by the Supreme Leader took a hard line against Saudi Arabia 
and the United States, leading to an increasingly complex and vitriolic struggle for regional 
order (Beck, 2020). In the Kingdom, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman deployed a 





Beyond the vitriol directed at each other, covid19 appeared to prompt a turn inwards to 
address domestic challenges exacerbated by the pandemic. Financial challenges brought 
about by the pandemic placed additional pressures on states and, in turn, raised questions 
about the articulation of national visions. Responses to the ensuing economic crisis ranged 
from budget cuts, spending freezes and the provision of financial support to banks and local 
business (Kozhanov and Zaccara, 2020). While Iran had previously struggled under 
“maximum pressure” sanctions, Arab Gulf states articulated opulent visions of the future, 
perhaps none grander than Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and its NEOM project. 
 
At the same time, the dramatic fall in oil prices has decimated the Kingdom’s economy, 
challenging Vision 2030 - and its flagship project NEOM - whilst also placing additional strain 
on a state that had already been subjected to austerity measures. All the while, in 2018 
Saudi military spending topped $60 billion according  to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, leaving it with the 5th largest military budget in the world (Mabon, 
2020).  
 
Of course, a key justification for the Kingdom’s military spending was the threat posed by 
Iran (Mabon, 2013). Yet in a surprising move, after attacks on the Abqaiq refinery in 2019, 
the Kingdom deployed a conciliatory tone, choosing to de-escalate, perhaps fearing the 
consequences of war with Iran. Another reading of this, of course, is the suggestion that this 
tone hid an inability to strike back against the Islamic Republic. These decisions were taken 
in the midst of rising pressure from the international community following the murder of 
Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, and the on-going war in Yemen. 
 
COVID19 calls into question these aspirations. Moreover, it raises doubts about the 
sustainability of expensive foreign policy excursions; in Iran, protesters expressed anger at 
the millions of dollars given to Hizballah while Iranians struggled. Similarly, some have 
suggested that the UAE withdrew from the Yemen war over concerns at a rising cost. These 
incidents both occurred prior to the pandemic, demonstrating the precarious financial 
context affecting many before the onset of covid19 which was exacerbated by the dramatic 
fall in oil prices. In light of this, the Emirati decision to embark on a vast soft power 
campaign, underpinned by humanitarian aid during the pandemic appears surprising, but 
reveals the size of perceived gains that could be made by improving relations with Iran. 
 
Further complicating regional order was the Emirati decision to normalise relations with 
Israel, once again building on long-standing working relationships (Jones and Guzansky: 
2019). The decision of the UAE to normalise relations with Israel has perhaps put an end to 
this thaw in relations. Indeed, for many in Tehran, the normalisation of relations moves to 
solidify what has traditionally been an anti-Iranian alliance, reflecting a broader shift 
in regional politics. In response to normalisation, Ali Khamenei declared that the UAE would 
be “disgraced forever” by the the betrayal of Palestinians (Hafezi: 2020). 
 
Taking the Temperature 
 
The emergence of the COVID19 pandemic in early 2020 added a new range of challenges to 
strategic planners across the Gulf. In Iran, the virus spread rapidly, with a devastating loss of 
life. In contrast, while the death toll in Saudi Arabia was far lower, officials were forced to 
cancel the minor pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, and limit the number of pilgrims allowed 
to make hajj due, removing both a valuable income stream and eroding the Al Saud’s main 
source of legitimacy. Changing domestic circumstances across the region placed additional 
pressure on foreign policy agendas. In Iran, economic hardship stemming from crippling 
sanctions imposed by the US meant that protesters took to the streets expressing anger at 
on-going financial support for groups including Hizballah. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, Crown 
Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s reform project set out in Vision 2030 faced an array of 
challenges, one of which was a dramatic increase in the cost of living.  
 
In these increasingly precarious financial conditions, the Emirati decision to offer support for 
Iran – amongst others - within the context of its broader humanitarian aid policies appears 
somewhat surprising, but reveals a broader strategy of positioning itself as an influential 
actor within global politics. The pandemic provided an opportunity for the UAE to do this, 
asserting how humanitarian credentials overrode longstanding anti-Iranian sentiment. Yet 
with an opportunity to assert more influence, particularly in Washington, meant that 
normalising relations with Israel was deemed more important. Perhaps then, we should 
view re-ordering of Gulf relations less with regard to Iran, and more with regard to an effort 
by the UAE to increase its influence on the region and global politics. 
 
Ultimately, although the covid19 pandemic created conditions for a re-ordering of regional 
politics, such efforts must be positioned within structural factors found at domestic and 
international levels. Without scope for manoeuvring domestically and internationally, any 
efforts at redrawing regional relations will prove ultimately unsuccessful. Although 
humanitarian concerns provided opportunities for the UAE to exert greater influence, and 
hinted at a possible thaw in relations with Iran, the precarious nature of regional politics and 
lack of domestic will amongst many in Washington and Riyadh have prevented a broader 
recalibration of regional order. In part, this is a consequence of the organisation of global 
politics and the role played by the United States, particularly over Iran. Indeed, 
acknowledging the importance of Washington prompted the UAE and Bahrain to normalise 
relations with Israel as a means of ensuring influence in the US, regardless who wins the 






Arab News, Saudi Arabia says Iran’s actions have helped spread the coronavirus around the 
world (06.03.20) https://www.arabnews.com/node/1637411/saudi-arabia  
Barnett, Michael, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (Columbia 
University Press, 1998)  
Beck, Martin, ‘The Aggravated Struggle for Regional Power in the Middle East: American 
Allies Saudi Arabia and Israel versus Iran’, Global Policy 11:1 (2020) 
Cole, Juan, Missed Opportunities: The Trump Administration, Iran and the Coronavirus 
Pandemic (Gulf Insights Series, No 31, June 2020) 
http://www.qu.edu.qa/static_file/qu/research/Gulf%20Studies/documents/Gulf%20Insights
%2031.pdf  
Datta-Ray, Deep K., ‘Small States and Pandemic: The UAE Approach’, RSiS Commentary no 
152- 4th August 2020. https://www.think-
asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/12299/CO20152-3.pdf?sequence=1 
Eltahir, Nafisa, and Lisa Barrington, Bahrain accuses Iran of ‘biological aggression’, Gulf 
states try to curb coronavirus (Reuters, 11.03.20) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
health-coronavirus-saudi-travel-idUSKBN20Z03K 
Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s diverging regional coronavirus 
strategy (Al Monitor, 09.04.20) https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/uae-
relations-iran-coronavirus-saudi-arabia.html  
Galeeva, Diana, The UAE’s Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak in Iran (LSE Blog, 05.04.20) 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/04/05/the-uaes-response-to-the-covid-19-outbreak-in-
iran/  
Goldberg, Jeffrey, Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler Look Good’, (The 
Atlantic, 02.04.18) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/mohammed-bin-salman-iran-
israel/557036/Hafezi, Parisa Iran’s Khamenei: UAE ‘disgraced forever’ by Israel deal 
(01.09.20) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-emirates-iran-idUSKBN25S4CA 
Hashemi, Nader and Danny Postel, Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle 
East (London: Hurst, 2017) 
Jones, Clive and Yoel Guzansky, Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies (Hurst: 
2020)  
Juneau, Thomas, ‘The UAE and the War in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration’, Survival: 
62:4 (2020) 
Kozhanov, Nikolay, and Luciano Zaccara (eds) Navigating Troubled Waters: Experts’ Views 
on GCC Challenges for Socio-Economic Recovery in the Post-Covid-19 Period (Gulf Insights 
Series, No. 30, May 2020) 
http://www.qu.edu.qa/static_file/qu/research/Gulf%20Studies/documents/Gulf%20Insights
%2030.pdf 
Mabon, Simon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: IB 
Tauris, 2013) 
Mabon, Simon, Houses built on sand: Violence, sectarianism and revolution in the Middle 
East (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020a) 
Mabon, Simon, Saudi, Iran and COVID-19 (IEMed.Focus, 164: 2020b) 
MehrNews, Mousavi appreciates humanitarian aid to Iran to fight against coronavirus 
(17.03.20) https://en.mehrnews.com/news/156813/Mousavi-appreciates-humanitarian-aid-
to-Iran-to-fight-against 
Ministry of Foreign affairs & International Cooperation, H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin zayed 
expresses UAE’s support to Iran due to COVID-19 (15.03.20) 
https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2020/3/15/15-03-2020-uae-iran 





Reuters, Update 1-U.S. blacklists 5 UAE-based companies over purchase of Iran oil (19.03.20) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-iran-sanctions-idUSL1N2BC0YM  
Reuters, Iran says it detained a UAE ship and its crew on Monday – state TV (20.08.20) 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-emirates-ship/iran-says-it-detained-a-uae-ship-and-
its-crew-on-monday-state-tv-idUKKBN25G150  
Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad, How sanctions and the pandemic affect Iran’s economy (Gulf Insights 
Series, No.33 July 2020) 
http://www.qu.edu.qa/static_file/qu/research/Gulf%20Studies/documents/Gulf%20Insights
%2033.pdf  
Ulrichsen, Kristian, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis (London: Hurst, 2020)  
Wastnidge, Edward, Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy Under Khatami (IB Tauris, 
2016) 
